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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GOLDEN KEY REALTY, INC.
and W. PETER BRANDLEY,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 19083

P. J. MANTAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a real estate broker to recover a
real estate commission.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury on a special interrogatory
verdict.

The jury in answering the special interrogatories

found that the broker had used reasonable efforts in selling
the subject property, but found that there had been an accord
Jnd satisfaction wherein the broker had agreed to accept a reduction in his commission.

Notwithstanding the special ver-

diet, the Court, upon motion of respondent, granted judgment

roe the full commission.

The trial court refused, however, to

award respondent costs, prejudgment interest, or attorney's
fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent has cross appealed seeking costs, interest
attorney's fees.

Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the

trial court affirmed, subject to a modification for the addition of interest and attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts fails in total to comply
with Rule 75(p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedurel.

For this

reason, respondents desire to restate the facts in a proper and
accurate manner.
Respondent, Golden Key Realty, Inc., is a Utah corporatioo
engaged in the business of selling real estate.

Respondent,

Peter Brandley, is a licensed real estate broker of eleven
years, licensed for himself and for Golden Key Realty
(R-2,8,254).

(Hereafter, respondents will jointly be referred

to as "Brandley").
Appellant Mantas was the owner of real property at 7774
West 2400 South in Salt Lake County, where he operated a used
truck and used truck parts business (R-145).

Mantas became

acquainted with Brandley as a result of a sale of property th;'

1 Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providesf
that the appellant• s brief shall contain a concise statement '.'.
the material facts of case citing pages of the record supporl·
such statement.
Appellant's brief makes no citation at all
the record.
-
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had made from Mantas' brother's estate (R-146).

As a

result of that transaction, Mantas asked Brandley if he would
sell Mantas' business property (R-146).

This request ultimately

resulted in the execution of a standard real estate listing
agreement (R-146).

The listing agreement required the broker to

use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser; established a listing price of $330,000.00; and obligated the owner to pay a 6%
commission if the property were sold within the six month listing period (Exhibit P-1).
After obtaining the listing, Brandley made efforts to sell
the property.

These efforts consisted of listing the property

on the multiple listing exchange, having the effect of making
the property known to approximately 2500 real estate brokers
(R-255); sending approximately 800 letters to prospective business purchasers in Salt Lake, Provo, Ogden, Los Angeles, San
Francisco and Phoenix (R-255,256,257); advertising the property
in the Wall Street Journal and local papers (R-257); and contacting other brokers (R-235).

These efforts resulted in the

obtaining of several offers, none of which ever closed because
they were either unacceptable to the owner, or because the buyer
couldn't qualify for financing (R-91,257).
During the period of time that the listing was in effect,
Mantas sold the property to a Mr. Lan England for $300,000.00
IR-147).

Mantas bypassed the broker in making this sale and

"laimed that England was not a buyer that had been found as a
- 3 -

result of the broker's efforts.
After the sale to Lan England, Brandley demanded payment
his commission.

Two oral conversations took place where this

subject was discussed.

The first was a conversation at Mantas'

place of business wherein Mantas claimed that Brandley agreed
accept $5,000.00 to satisfy the commission claim (R-179);
Brandley denied that any such agreement was made, but
that various figures were "batted arour;id" and the parties agrw
to meet the next day at Dee's Family Restaurant and try to
finalize an agreement (R-259).

The parties did in fact meet,,

following day at Dee's Restaurant and the following is Mantas'
version of the conversation that took place (R-193):
Q. (By Mr. West):

But, in any event, there was some

conversation about settlement and -- was the meeting by
ment the next day?
A.

(By Mr. Mantas):

Yes, sir.

Q.

And then, what?

A.

We agreed on the price --

Q.

Well, did you meet at Dee's?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you have breakfast together there or something.

A.

No, sir, we just stopped in and had a drink and

Q.

How long did that whole conversation take place whi

You came over to Dee's cafe and met'

you were there at Dee's Family Restaurant?
A.

Probably half an hour.
-
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Q.

So you sat there in -- did you sit down at a booth?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you sat a half hour and talked about some way of

rPsolving the settlement, is that right?
A.

Yes, for his money.

Q.

Now,

that was the time

you handed him a check for

$2,SOO, was it not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you had written something on the back of the check,

something about being
A.

Balance due.

I wrote a small contract

between myself

and him.
Q.

You wrote that on the back of the check?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now,

isn't it true that at that time, that right there

in Dee's cafe, he said to you, Mr. Mantas, I don't think that
this is fair?
A.

After he took the check and had the check in his hand.

Q.

Then he says, I don't think this is fair.

Is that we

he said?
A.
fair.
llin1e

He said words -- something like, I don't think this is
don't recollect exactly the words, but he says, I will

to see an attorney about it.
Q.

Yes, he said something to the substance and effect

"nar, I don't think this is fair and I'm going to see my attorney

about it?

- 5 -

fair,

A.

After he had the check in his hand.

Q.

After you handed him the piece of paper,

A.

He read the back of the check.

Q.

And he took the check and said, I don't think it's

I'm going to go see my attorney about it?

the checK'

Is that what

happened?
A.
hand.

The best I recollect, yes.
I says, Here it is,

He took the check from m;

there's a small contract.

He alsc

stated at the time -- he was assured tnat he would get the
balance of his

agreed upon and I told him that on the

back of the check I wrote a little contract binding it.

I says

I have also taken a picture of the check.

Q.

That's what you wrote on the check?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you handed him the check when he made this comment

about not thinking this was fair and he wanted to go see his
attorney?
I've let this go on quite a bit and

MR. HALL:

I object.

MR. WEST:

I think the evidence is in and I won't pursue

any further, counsel.
Q.

(By Mr. West)

Then after that, the check was given

back to you, was it not?
A.

The check was mailed back to me.

Q.

The check has never to this day ever been cashed?
-
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A.

No, sir.

Q.

And there's never been any tender by you of any $5,000

or any other amount other than the check that you gave him?
MR. HALL:

Your Honor, I don't believe the witness can re-

spond adequately to the legal term "tender".
Q.

(By Mr. West)

I'm not using the legal term of tender.

You have never given him any other checks other than that
one $2,500 check that was returned?
A.

No,

I never gave him any other check, no, sir.

(The check referred to above was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-6) .
Brandley's version of what took place at Dee's Family
Restaurant was substantially similar to Mantas' testimony.
Brandley testifed as follows (R-260):
Q.

(By Mr. West)

Would you state what you said and what

Mr. Mantas said when you had the conversation down at Dee's
Family Restaurant.
A.

(By Mr. Brandley)

Well, Mr. Mantas mentioned this

$5,000 and I told him I didn't think that was enough.
said, Well, that's all you're going to get.

Then he gave me

this check for $2,500, $2,500 to come in 90 days.
1

Then he

I said, Pete,

rlon't like this, I'm going to take this to my attorney.
Q.

was there any more said in the conversation?

A.

No.

Q.

And then you left and he left.
- 7 -

A.

That's right.

Based upon the above,

the jury in its special inter raga•

verdict found that there had been an accord and satisfaction
( R-38).
The Court thereafter entered judgment on the verdict
(R-91).

Brandley moved to alter and amend the judgment, seeK:

the full commission,
(R-88) .2

interest, costs and attorney's fees

Judge Daniels granted the motion in part, holding rn

effect that there cannot as a matter of law be an oral modif1·
cation of a contract required by the statute of frauds to be
writing

(R-105).

i'

Brandley was awarded judgment of $18,000,

being 6% of the sale price of the property (R-105).

The tria:

judge refused to make an award to Brandley of prejudgment inte:
est, attorney's fees or costs (R-105).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE BROKER JUDGMENT
FOR HIS FULL COMMISSION
A.

There Can Be No Oral Modification of a Contract
Required by the Statute of Frauds to be in Wr1t1ng.

It was undisputed in this action that the property was s•,
during the listing period.

Utah law is clearly to the effect

that a broker is entitled to a commission where the property

2 Brandley had previously made a motion for a directed ver·
diet based upon the statute of frauds and other grounds. Tf'"
reporter's transcript, however, contains nothing beyond the
testimony of the witnesses and is not complete.
The motion
directed verdict was denied at that time.
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I"

by the owner during the listing period.

Cheney v. Rucker,

Utah 2d 205, 351 P.2d 86 (1963); Strout v. Broderick, 522

P.2d 144 (Utah 1974); Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen Brothers
Construction Company, 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982).
It is also clear that any agreement authorizing or employing a broker to sell real estate is required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing.3

This being so, it follows that

there can be no oral modification of a written agreement required by the statue of frauds to be in writing.

Strevell

Paterson v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982); Zions Properties

v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah
2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970); Combined Metals v. Bastian, 71 Utah
535, 267 Pac. 1020 (1928).

The most recent pronouncement of

this basic legal principle was made only last year in Strevell
Paterson v.

Francis, supra, and was concurred in by all member

of the present court.

There it was stated:

"By the same token, the release or revocation of an
agreement to answer for the debt of another must
also be in writing.
It is well settled that if an
original agreement is within the Statute of Frauds,
any subsequent agreement which alters or amends it
must also satisfy the requirements of the statute.
(Authorities cited).
The alleged oral release
obviously does not meet those requirements of enforcibility.
Neither does defendant allege or prove
any acts done in reliance on or as part performance
of the oral release that would remove it from the
operation of the statute.
Therefore, the existence
or nonexistence of an oral release does not constitute a genuine issue of material fact, and the trial
court correctly held that plaintiff was entitled to
judgment on this issue as a matter of law".

§25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated.
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The language of Strevell-Paterson specifically refers to
releases, revocations, alterations or amendments of a written
contract.

Combined Metals v. Bastian, supra, also includes the

term modification.

To say that an accord and satisfaction does

not involve a release, revocation, or modification of an
existing contract is to ignore the very definition of that tern
An accord and satisfaction is an agreement between two persoM,
one of whom has a right against the other, that the latter
should do or give, and the former accept, something in
satisfaction of the right of action different from, and usually
less than, what might be legally enforced.
DICTIONARY 4th Edition, 1951.

BLACK'S LAW

In other words, there must be an

original contract to be revoked, released or modified before
there can even be an accord and satisfaction.

Furthermore,

there is no logical reason why an accord and satisfaction shouk
be exempted from the operation of the rule.

The very purpose of

the Statute of Frauds is to prevent unfounded and fraudulent
claims.

Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, §448.

If there

were ever a case where the Statute of Frauds ought to apply it
is a case like the instant case where the oral agreement is
denied by the party to be charged, and the evidence in support
thereof was at best suspicious.
B.

There was No Accord and Satisfaction In This Case.

Appellant has argued that an accord and satisfaction
operates as a new agreement and for some unexplained reason

- 10 -

should be exempt from the operation of the rule requiring
modification of Statute of Fraud contracts to be writing.

But

even appellant concedes that the rule would apply if there were
no accord and satisfaction.
The trial judge in the instant case used the language
dccord and satisfaction in his instructions to the jury and in
the jury verdict form.

Although this terminology was used, the

undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that there was never
technically an accord and satisfaction, but only an accord if
appellant's evidence is believea.4

The rule is universally

accepted (except where the new agreement itself is accepted as a
satisfaction) that a mere executory accord, without satisfaction, constitute no bar to the enforcement of the original
claim.

1 AM. JUR.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §47.

Under the

facts of the instant case, the alleged promise itself to accept
a lesser sum could not have been accepted as a satisfaction.5
The evidence was undisputed that the full $5,000 which Mantas
claimed that the broker agreed to accept was never paid or
tendered.

Thus, there was never any completed accord and

satisfaction, and appellant's entire argument fails.

See Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d
(Utah 1977) explaining that an accord is the agreement and
the satisfaction is the execution or performance of such
agreement.
1383

See §419 Restatement of Contracts stating in effect that

the substituted performance must be of a different nature (that
is something other than payment in cash) in order for the

Promise itself to be a satisfaction.
- 11 -

C.

None Of Appellant's Authorities Are In Point.

None of the authorities cited by apFellant supports
conclusion that the trial court committed error.
cases are cited in appellant's brief.

Four Utah

These cases discuss

generally the legal principles of accord and satisfaction, but
none of the cases discuss the Statute of Frauds, nor do any

of

them involve contracts required by the Statute of Frauds to
in writing.

None of the Utah cases are in point.

Appellant cites as his strongest authority the case of
Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1951).

Gaido involved the

parol discharge of a contract for the sale of land.

The case.·

readily distinguishable in that Gaido performed to the letter
and in full his obligation under the oral agreement of the
parties, and the vendor had sold the land to another.

The

Cour·

correctly noted that the Statute of Frauds has no application
where there has been full and complete performance of the
contract by one of the contracting parties.

The language and

authority in Gaido to the effect that written contracts within
the Statute of Frauds may be the subject of an oral accord
satisfaction is really nothing more than an application of the
doctrine of part performance.

Gaido is not substantially

different from Cutright v. Union Savings & Investment Company,
33 Utah 486, 94 Pac. 984 (1908) where the Utah court reached
similar decision in connection with an oral rescission of a
contract for the sale of land.
-

But the Utah Court
12 -

carefully noted in its decision that if the parol agreement is
wholly executory, it is within the Statute of Frauds and could
not be enforced any more than any other oral agreement concerning an interest in real estate.

These authorities clearly sup-

port repondents' position that an executory promise to pay a
lesser amount is still within the Statute of Frauds.
D. There Was No Consideration For an Accord and Satisfaction
It was undisputed in this case that the alleged accord
agreement took place after Mantas sold the property and was
already indebted to the broker for an $18,000 real estate commission.

In Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderon, 610 P.2d

1369 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:
"Where, however, the underlying claim is liquidated
and certain as to amount, separate consideration must
be found to support the accord; otherwise, the obligor binds himself to nothing he was not already
obligated to do, and the obligees promise to accept
a substitue performance is unenforceable".
While it is true that settlement of a disputed claim may
constitute sufficient consideration6, it is difficult to
determine from the facts of this case any legitimate good faith
dispute.

Mantas claimed that Brandley was not entitled to a

commission because he failed to use reasonable efforts to sell
the property.

Yet the uncontradicted testimony presented at

trial showed that the efforts of Brandley were very substantial.

Jnder these circumstances, the Court could easily find as a

Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383

I Utah 1977).
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matter of law that the alleged accord and satisfaction
lacked consideration.
E.

There Has Been No Part Performance To Take the Case
Out of The Statute of Frauds.

Appellant's evidence was to the effect that he handed the
broker a check for $2, 500 representing one-half of the alleged
agreed upon amount; that the broker took it saying that he die
not think this amount was fair and that he was going to see hE
attorney about it; and that the checll: was thereafter returned,
uncashed, by the broker's attorney.

These facts were not in

dispute, and it is respondents' position that they cannot as
a matter of law constitute a basis for part performance.
§30A-3-802, Utah Code Annotated (Uniform Comercial Code)
provides in effect that the mere giving of a check (unless a
bank is the drawer of the check) does not discharge the
obligation for which it is given, but merely suspends the
obligation until the check is honored.

Thus, by statute, the

uncashed check cannot be considered as payment. 7
Moreover, aside from the Uniform Commercial Code, it is
clear that the mere taking physical possession of a check does
not constitute payment of the debt where the creditor does
nothing indicating his intention to receive the check as

1

7
In addition, there was no evidence presented at trial tha
the check would be good.
Inasmuch as payment is an affirmatl,'
defense, it would seem that there was a failure on the part rt
respondent to meet his burden of proof.

- 14 -

cayment. 8

This would be true whether or not the check was

returned, but in the instant case the check was returned.

To

say that the broker accepted the check as payment, is to ignore
the undisputed evidence.
But even if the Court were to ignore the Uniform Commercial
Code, and ignore the common law of payment, the appellant still
couldn't prevail because payment alone is not generally
considered sufficient to take a case out of the Statute of
Frauds.

The general law covering this subject is summarized at

73 AM. JUR. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §463, where it is stated:
"The courts of most jurisdictions hold that the mere
payment of a portion of the purchase money, unacompanied by any other act or exceptional circumstance, does not amount to part performance of
an oral land contract sufficient to take the case
out of the Statute of Frauds ..• Accordingly, it
is now the general rule in most jurisidictions that
the mere payment of the purchase money by the
purchaser of land, without other acts, is not
sufficient as an act of part performance •.• The
reason often given for the rule that payment alone
is not sufficient is that the plaintiff is considered as having a sufficient remedy at law to
recover back the money, it being considered that
since he has performed in no respect other than
the payment of money, there is a definite and
certain standard for estimating his damages •.•
The rule has sometimes been stated that payment
of the consideration without more, is not a
sufficient part performance, where its recovery
in an action at law would fully indemnify the
purchaser".
Thus, to constitute part performance, there must be payment
coupled with something else such as taking possession, putting
i11

improvements or some similar action.

60 AM. JUR. 2d, Payment, §46.
- 15 -

Most of the cases and

authorities on this subject deal with contracts for the sale
land, but the same principles would apply to other contracts
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing.
POINT I I
THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE ISSUE REGARDING QUESTIONS
TAKEN FROM THE JURY
Appellant claims at Point II of his brief that the trial
court committed error in refusing to instruct the jury on issue
of fraud, conspiracy or breach of fid\,lciary duty.

There are nc

references to any part of the record as to what facts are beinc
claimed, and no specific facts are documented or even alleged.
It is improper to make blanket assertions and then leave it to
court, or to the respondents, to ferret out evidence from the
record in support of or in opposition to said assertions.
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc.
333 P.2d 1061 (1959).

v.

Bennett, 8 Utah 2d 293,

The sufficiency or insufficiency of

evidence to support a ruling by the trial court should not be
considered on appeal in the absence of references to the recor:
and transcript as to where the testimony can be found.
v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
In the absence of anything more than appellant's sweepiM
statements, respondents cannot consider appellant's Point II i:
a legitimate issue on appeal.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD RESPONDENTS
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
Respondents have cross-appealed and claim that the trlL
-
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:ourt erred in not awarding prejudgment interest, attorney's
fees and costs.

These three items will be considered

separately.
A.

Interest.

§15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended

provides that the legal rate of interest on the forebearance of
any money, goods or things in action shall be 10% per annum.
Prejudgment interest is recoverable in any action where the loss
is fixed as of a particular time and the loss can be calculated
with mathematical accuracy.

Jorgensen v. John Clay & Company,

660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company, 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 1978).
Respondent is unaware of any case which leaves it up to the
trial court as to whether to award or not to award prejudgment
interest.

Indeed, it has been stated to the contrary in Lignell

v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979) as follows:
"In contract cases, certainly, interest on amounts
found to be due in judicial proceedings is recovery
to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of
law".
See also Anderson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
supra, where the refusal to award prejudgment interest was part
of the basis for a reversal.

This is not a matter that is

discretionary with the trial court and respondents are clearly
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.
B.

Attorney's Fees.

The listing agreement, which was the

subject of this action, provided as follows (Exhibit P-1):
"In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce
any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay
a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection".
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Respondents presented evidence, whicn was unchallenged,
that reasonable attorney's fees had been incurred in the amc.
of $3,220.009.

In spite of the contract between the parties,

and the undisputed evidence before the Court, the trial Judg'
refused to award attorney's fees.
In Utah, attorney's fees are recoverable when provided'
by statute or contract.

Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801

(Utah 1978); Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977).

The

amount of attorney's fees to be awarded· a prevailing party

is

generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Turtle Management Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Ut,
1982).

However,

it is clearly an abuse of discretion to awar:

nothing, where the contract for the payment of fees and the
reasonable amount thereof are not in dispute.

Respondents ars

entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
C.

Attorney's Fees on Appeal.

Not only are respondents

entitled to attorney's fees incurred in the court below, they
are also entitled to an additional award of attorney's fees
the appeal.

Early Utah cases held that attorney's fees on

appeal were discretionary with the Appellate Court.

The earl

decisions were expressly overruled in the recent case of
Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406
(Utah 1980) where the Court state as follows:

9

f,;

See Supplemental Stipulated Record.
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"The parties here agree to pay reasonable attorney's
fees if it became necessary to enforce the contract.
If plaintiff is required to defend its position on
appeal at its own expense, plaintiff's rights under
the contract are thereby diminished. We therefore
adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment
of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's
fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal
as well as at trial, if the action is brought to
enforce the contract, and overrule Swain and Downey
State Bank on this point insofar as they may be to
the contrary".
See also Centurian Corporation v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706 {Utah
1981) •

D.

Costs.

Rule 54{d){l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that costs shall be awarded as of course to the
prevailing party unless the Court otherwise directs.

Although

this rule leaves room for discretion in the trial court, it does
not address the issue of awarding costs where the parties have a
written contract covering this item.

It would seem that the

very same arguments that the Court raised in Management Services
v. Development Associates, supra, to allow attorney's fees on
appeal as a matter of right where the payment of attorney's fees
is a subject of contract would equally apply to a contractual
provision covering the payment of costs.

The appellant in his

written listing agreement agreed to pay both attorney's fees and
costs.

Respondents are therefore entitled to be awarded the

CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited
it is respectfully urged that the judgment of the trial
- 19 -

court be affirmed insofar as it relates to the principal am 0 ,,,.
of the judgment.

Upon remand, however, the trial court should be directed:·
accordance with respondents'

cross-appeal to modify the judgmen:

by including therein an award for

interest, attorney's fees,

attorney's fees on appeal and costs.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
DAVID E. WEST
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondents
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